

User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework

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ABSTRACT

Text passwords persist despite several decades of evidence of their security and usability challenges. It seems extremely unlikely a single scheme will globally replace text passwords, suggesting that a diverse ecosystem of multiple authentication schemes designed for specific environments is needed. Authentication scheme research has thus far proceeding in an unstructured manner. We propose that more useful novel schemes could develop from a more principled examination and application of promising authentication features. This paper presents the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework, a conceptual framework that classifies the various features that knowledge-based authentication schemes may support. This framework can be used by researchers when designing, comparing, and innovating authentication schemes, as well as administrators and users, who can use the framework to identify desirable features in schemes available for selection. We illustrate how the framework can be used by demonstrating its applicability to several authentication schemes, and briefly discussing the development and user testing of two framework-inspired schemes, Persuasive Text Passwords and Cued Gaze-Points. Our framework is intended to support the increasingly diverse ecosystem of authentication schemes by providing authentication researchers, professionals, and users with the increased ability to design, develop, and select authentication schemes better suited for particular applications, environments, and contexts.

Keywords

Authentication; framework; memory; Persuasive Technology; persuasion; security; usability; usable security

1. INTRODUCTION

For over 20 years, researchers have proposed numerous varieties of novel authentication systems, yet no proposals have globally replaced text passwords. Researchers are advocating the use of different schemes suitable for different contexts and applications, rather than completely replacing text passwords [16]. Many novel authentication schemes' designs

primarily address security challenges, placing usability challenges as secondary. However, poor usability is the primary cause of insecure authentication practices [25]. Since without usability, users cannot authenticate securely, we advocate for a more user-centric design and analysis of novel authentication schemes.

This paper presents the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework, which is a taxonomy of some of the key user-centred features that schemes can support. This conceptual framework is intended to assist with the understanding, innovation, and usage of knowledge-based authentication schemes. It enables authentication researchers and scheme developers to make clear and deliberate design choices supported by research literature. Systematically examining this taxonomy during the scheme design process can highlight features warranting further exploration that may otherwise have been overlooked. Although the features we present certainly impact security, the framework focuses on users' experiences and the underlying psychological concepts. We foreground these user-centred issues since design solutions to authentication problems have often been decided somewhat haphazardly, without carefully considering the solutions' full impact on the user.

In this paper, we first cover relevant background, including how our framework assists in scheme design while Bonneau et al. [5] focus on assessing authentication technologies. We then describe each of our framework's classes and their member features, and provide examples of existing schemes supporting them. We discuss the possible applications of our framework by identifying the features supported by existing schemes. We briefly illustrate with how a systematic application of our framework's features has propagated advances in authentication research through two authentication schemes. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.

2. BACKGROUND

Our framework focuses primarily on features found in knowledge-based authentication (KBA) schemes, defined as a human entity authenticating itself by proving knowledge of some shared secret to the entity requesting the authentication [21]. This definition excludes biometric, token-based, and key-based authentication systems [21]. KBA is popular because it is relatively inexpensive to implement and typically requires no additional hardware. KBA schemes can theoretically be very secure, but their practical security is often limited by the lack of uniqueness and complexity of the shared secrets that humans can remember [16].

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<http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/ICS-08-2014-0058>




Figure 1: Illustration of the elements common to all knowledge-based authentication (KBA) schemes.

Bonneau et al. [5] have published the most recent survey of novel KBA schemes. They propose a framework for measuring and comparing authentication systems’ security, usability, and deployability. This framework is excellent for evaluating the practical trade-offs between existing authentication systems. By comparing multiple authentication systems in their framework, they made the important observation that choosing one scheme over another necessarily results in choosing one set of trade-offs over another, and that no scheme is perfect. They conclude that text passwords are unlikely to be the best choice for all requirements, contexts, and threat models.

Bonneau et al.’s framework and our own take complementary views of authentication systems. Their framework assesses existing authentication technologies’, while our framework informs and supports the creative design process of authentication schemes. The User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework explicitly defines high-level design features largely grounded in one of two sources: human capabilities identified in psychology and cognitive science research and existing authentication schemes which demonstrated particularly unique and promising design techniques. Our framework simplifies the task of designing KBA systems by serving as a single reference for the known human characteristics and distinctive scheme features that can aid in the design of successful novel authentication schemes.

3. USER-CENTRED AUTHENTICATION FEATURE FRAMEWORK

Knowledge-based authentication (KBA) schemes typically have two phases; registration and login (Figure 1). The registration phase involves the KBA scheme assigning a password to the user or prompting the user to generate a password, which they must memorize. During the login phase, the user must retrieve the password from memory and provide it to the scheme. Schemes may facilitate these processes by supporting particular types of features.

As listed in Table 1, the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework consists of a set of features that KBA schemes may support. Features are classified into one of the following four feature classes: A. Persuasion features attempt to influence the user to select more secure or memorable passwords than they would otherwise. These features may be particularly useful for authentication schemes where it may not be obvious to the user how to generate a secure and

Section	Feature Class	Feature Name
3.1	Persuasion	Simplification
		Personalisation
		Monitoring
		Conditioning
3.2	Memory	Social interaction
		Lexical memory
		Visual memory
		Semantic memory
		Episodic memory
		Procedural memory
		Perceptual memory
		Cueing
3.3	Input and output	Keyboard
		Mouse
		Touch
		Eye gaze
		Haptic
		Vocal
		Visual output
3.4	Obfuscation	Tactile feedback
		Auditory
		Obscured input
		Obscured feedback
		Challenge-response

Table 1: User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework.

memorable password. However, these features should be used carefully since some users may object to persuasion that is too forceful. B. Memory features identify the various cognitive methods used to remember passwords. Some memory features focus on users’ working memory to encode passwords into long-term memory. Other memory features support storing passwords in different formats in long-term memory. Users may have different abilities for particular memory types, and would prefer schemes that support particular memory features. C. Input and output features categorize different methods of inputting passwords and receiving feedback. These features are an important consideration when designing authentication schemes for devices with novel interfaces or for particular groups of users. For example, users with disabilities often need alternative input and output modalities, so designers should carefully consider which method of input and output will best support users. D. Obfuscation features attempt to make it more difficult for illicit observers to intercept users’ passwords. These features can significantly improve security, but often at the cost of decreased usability. Thus, the scheme’s threat model should be carefully considered before employing obfuscation features. The implementation and testing of those features should also be carefully executed, to ensure that the scheme meets the expected usability benchmarks.

Each of these classes encompasses multiple features with inherent advantages and disadvantages. A given authentication scheme may support features from any class. A scheme that supports more features is not necessarily superior to another that supports fewer features. This conceptual framework is intended as a taxonomy of features that schemes may support. We believe that it covers the most relevant or popular features characterizing authentication schemes, but

the framework can be expanded to include features we may have overlooked, novel features from advances in authentication technology, or additional dimensions to feature support, such as when a feature is only supported conditionally or to varying degrees across schemes. We will now describe in detail each of framework’s current classes and features.

3.1 Persuasion

Authentication systems may leverage persuasion to guide users to generate more secure and memorable credentials and promote secure behaviour in general. Persuasive Technology (PT) [13] is popular in many domains seeking “interactive computing systems designed to change people’s attitudes and behaviours”. PT can influence users to behave in some desired manner by using well-established theories from behavioural, personality, and social psychology. This section groups and describes the PT principles that can be reasonably integrated into KBA systems, since not all of PT theory is practically applicable to authentication.

3.1.1 Simplification

Authentication tasks should be as simple as possible. This includes reducing the process to the fewest actions and lowest complexity. Users can more easily form an accurate mental model of simpler authentication processes. Users are less likely to circumvent security tasks which are easier to perform. Ideally, the desired actions should form the path-of-least-resistance [7], whereby users can more easily perform the authentication properly than to evade it.

For example, password managers reduce the burden on users by having the computer generate and/or remember complex passwords for them. Users typically need only enter one master password to activate the program, yet each of their accounts is protected by a distinct complex password generated by the password manager.

3.1.2 Personalisation

Customised information for individual users typically offers a more personal and engaging experience, which could be more persuasive than generic information. Users are concerned with security and privacy if they understand the implications and consequences of their actions [25]. By offering appropriately-timed personalised advice relating to the individual’s needs, preferences, or context, the system can provide details about why users’ current behaviour is insecure and how it can be modified to be more secure. Because the information is personalised and offered at the moment it is most relevant, it is more likely to help improve users’ mental models of security and help them understand the relevance of behaving securely.

For example, users could list some general interests to a system that would customise a mnemonic phrase [32] to help users remember a system-assigned random password. The given mnemonic phrase could further include system-related content or pronounceable tokens [30], helping users to rehearse and mentally link their mnemonic phrase and password to the system. This teaches users coping strategies for remembering passwords that can be applied to other randomly-generated passwords as well, thereby encouraging the use of both secure and memorable passwords.

3.1.3 Monitoring

When aware that they are being observed, users are more likely to perform the desired behaviour. A system tracking user performance or status can report it directly to the users, who may then adjust their behaviour in accordance with security policies. The system should provide the opportunity for users to learn how to behave more securely. This monitoring can be automated by the system or report to administrators who then take action. Furthermore, events that threaten security often happen in the background, over a long period of time, or as a result of a series of user actions. It may not be obvious to users that these events are occurring and may result in a security breach. In these cases, monitoring can help the system recognise these circumstances and bring them to the users’ attention. It is especially important for the system to notify the user of dangerous behavioural errors that threaten their security, without revealing information to attackers.

The most widely used form of monitoring in authentication is password strength meters [11]. When the user is creating a text password, a password strength meter illustrates the estimated strength of the user-entered password. As users change the characters in their password, many strength meters update in real-time, providing users with an effective motivation for creating a password that is deemed secure by the meter.

3.1.4 Conditioning

Computer security is concerned about potential threats and risks to the system. However, most users have little direct experience with the consequences of an attack. When users perform a mental risk analysis, they often believe the additional burden of correctly performing the security tasks outweighs the probability of being attacked. In these cases, we need to artificially induce the correct behaviour since it is not supported by the users’ natural environment. With user authentication, we want to convince people to use secure passwords even though it is a secondary task. For users to learn from any conditioning strategy, there should be other techniques at work to help users understand how to create effective passwords in order to receive the rewards for behaving securely. Examples of conditioning inducements in authentication systems (that may warrant study in future work) include:

- Longer sessions before a time-out occurs, requiring users to re-enter their password less frequently.
- Access to extra features, benefits, and customisations.
- Faster system response.
- A golden lock icon with encouraging messages like, “Your password is very secure! Good job!”

3.1.5 Social interaction

Authentication is an activity that typically occurs in isolation. In contrast, physical security leverages social norms to influence behaviour and encourage secure behaviour. For example, the presence of security personnel may cause someone to reconsider entering a building without proper credentials. The social interaction principle leverages social norms by repositioning user authentication as a social activity.

A system that shares users’ attitudes, traits, personality, and membership is more persuasive. Such traits can be conveyed

through language similar to the user’s, conveying a sense of “team” and encouraging cooperation. Positive and supportive language, such as personally greeting, befriending, and praising users, may further compel users to behave securely. Additionally, the system can represent an authority figure, adding more persuasive power for users who respond well to authority.

For example, users can be taught that their own insecure behaviour puts others at risk. Through careful wording and presentation by the security system, users may develop a sense of belonging and duty towards their colleagues and organisation. For example, users can be told:

- Insecure accounts compromise not only their own account but the entire system.
- Everyone is counting on them to do their part.
- Their efforts at keeping the organisation secure are crucial and appreciated.
- “Other employees have passwords this strong. You don’t want to be the weakest link.”

3.2 Memory

Memory is critical to knowledge-based authentication since its very nature depends on humans’ ability to recall credentials. There are two types of memory: short-term and long-term.

3.2.1 Short-term memory

Short-term memory (STM) or working memory is defined as the human capacity to mentally retain information to perform the current task [1]. The more a piece of information is processed and used in STM, the more likely it is to be encoded and easily accessible in long-term memory (LTM). The most widely-accepted model for STM [1] includes a central executive responsible for managing attention, decision-making, and correlating information encoded by two slave systems, the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop retains verbal, auditory, and textual information through rehearsal. The visuospatial sketchpad holds visual, spatial, and possibly kinesthetic information.

This suggests KBA secrets can be represented either lexically and/or visually. Users currently strongly rely on text passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs), which are both lexical KBA systems. However, research has suggested that people’s memory for visual stimuli is better than text [24]. Thus, usable authentication researchers are exploring graphical passwords [3] to improve memorability.

The primary role of STM in authentication is to encode credentials into and later retrieve them from LTM. Information is typically encoded into LTM through rehearsal in STM. The more often and deeply information is rehearsed in STM, the more easily it can be retrieved from LTM [1]. Elaborative rehearsal (e.g., associating a number with a meaningful date) facilitates information recall more than maintenance rehearsal (e.g., repeating a number).

Long-term memory includes cognitive functions that store information for later retrieval and use. Without persistent information retrieval, KBA would be impossible. KBA system developers should be knowledgeable about LTM. Understanding memory may result in a user experience that




Figure 2: Classification of long-term memory types.

facilitates the encoding of credentials into LTM. Figure 2 classifies some general types of LTM.

3.2.2 Explicit memory

Explicit (or declarative) memory is the deliberate and conscious retrieval of information from LTM. There are two types of explicit memory [28]. Episodic memory represents the recollection of events or situations from the past, such as a previous birthday or where someone recalls seeing their keys. Semantic memory represents the storage of factual knowledge without remembering where or how such knowledge was learnt. This includes information about people and objects (e.g., names and descriptions). Semantic memory is often supported by episodic memory. For example, when trying to remember someone’s name (using semantic memory), people sometimes try recalling when and where they previously encountered said person (using episodic memory).

Text passwords are the most obvious example of an authentication scheme that uses explicit memory. Users may choose to leverage semantic memory by basing their password on information of relevance to them. They may also derive their password from a particular event through episodic memory.

3.2.3 Implicit memory

Implicit memory refers to the ability to automatically recall some piece of information without consciously retrieving it. Implicit memory can be subdivided into two types. Procedural memory involves remembering how to perform actions. People do not need to explicitly recall how to perform actions stored in procedural memory; they “just know” how to drive a car or access a website. Perceptual memory (or priming) is the cognitive function where a recent experience subconsciously influences a person’s behaviour. This effect is illustrated in experiments asking participants to complete a set of words beginning with some letters. Participants who read a word list before the task are significantly more likely to unknowingly use words from the list than participants who had not read the list.

Explicit memory is slower and more effortful to access than implicit memory [22], which suggests a clear advantage for authentication schemes leveraging implicit memory. Bojinov et al. [4] proposed the first scheme to use only procedural memory. Users perform a Serial Interception Sequence Learning (SISL) task (Figure 3), whereby on-screen columns each correspond to a keyboard button. Objects descend the columns at constant speed. The user’s goal is to press the correct column’s key when an object reaches the bottom of the column (as in “Guitar Hero” or “Dance Dance Revolution”). During a 30-60 minute registration, users perform hundreds of SISL tasks, unaware that 80%




Figure 3: Serial Interception Sequence Learning (SISL) task [4].

contain covertly embedded repeating sequences that users are implicitly trained to perform more accurately (through repetition) than random sequences. At login, the user is granted access if they perform the trained sequences better than random sequences. A user study demonstrated that SISL worked as designed two weeks after registration. Although SISL’s registration and login time is too long for most practical uses, this work demonstrates the potential of procedural memory for authentication.

3.2.4 Cueing

It is difficult to spontaneously recall information without context-specific assistance leveraging prospective memory or memory cueing [1]. This suggests that authentication schemes should provide users with cues to facilitate memory retrieval. However, care must be taken, since ill-considered cues may reveal password information to adversaries.

Cues support both explicit and implicit memory, depending on context and the cue’s presentation [22]. The saliency of a presented cue does not seem to improve memory any more than a cue that is present but not particularly salient [12]. Thus, the mere presence of a cue within the authentication context should assist users in recalling their credentials.

Recognition and cued-recall graphical passwords [3] are the KBA systems that best utilise cueing thus far, to varying degrees. For example, in Cued Click-Points [9] (and derivatives), the user chooses a click-point on each image in a sequence. Each image serves as a memory cue for each click-point location. A widely-deployed example is Windows 8’s picture password scheme.

Users may also need some guidance on how to use the cue to create a password that is both memorable and secure. Otherwise, they may simply fall back on less secure password creation strategies [25]. For example, two-thirds of Chiasson et al.’s [8] study participants who were required to create several passwords for different mock systems (e.g., bank, e-mail, blog) referenced the system in their password. It appears that users take advantage of memory cues whenever possible, whether or not cues are deliberately provided. However, adversaries attacking all system accounts could incorporate cue-based information in a horizontal password guessing attack. This vulnerability can be mitigated if different users are provided different cues.

3.3 Input and output

It may sometimes be advantageous to use an entry method other than the standard mouse, keyboard, or number pad. One ubiquitous example is touch devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets), where users interact with devices by directly touching the display. Unfortunately, it is difficult to perform some tasks with touch devices, such as entering text passwords, since typing is more difficult on touch devices than keyboards [19]. The growing popularity of touch devices only increases the need for authentication methods designed for touch input.

Most work in varying the input modality has been to defend against shoulder-surfing attacks. Examples include a text password entry system where users would gaze at on-screen keyboard keys to “type” their password [18], a haptic keypad that generates vibrations providing user feedback regarding the keys’ values [2], and a brain-computer interface to measure brains’ binary responses to presented stimuli [27].

Additional input and output (I/O) modalities could enable people with difficulties using standard I/O methods to also use the given scheme. For example, most KBA systems use a visual output modality, which poses clear challenges to visually-impaired users, both for inputting their credentials and receiving feedback. Visually-impaired users may benefit from authentication schemes supporting a vocal input or auditory output modality [6]. Furthermore, standard I/O modalities are sometimes unavailable, inconvenient, or dangerous. If car drivers need directions to their destination, but first must authenticate to their mobile device, any authentication scheme requiring use of their hands or visual attention poses a risk to their lives. This risk could be avoided if the authentication scheme supported input and output other than touch and visual display, such as vocal input and auditory output. By methodically examining this framework’s I/O modalities and carefully considering their advantages for a novel authentication scheme design, novel schemes could accommodate more users and use cases, including users with accessibility needs or different preferences and usage contexts beyond the standard computer user.

3.4 Obfuscation

A KBA concern is observation attacks; when an adversary observes the authentication process and discovers part or the whole authentication secret [23]. Anyone can shoulder-surf; watch or record the authentication within users’ physical proximity. Obscured feedback offers the simplest defence to shoulder-surfing, whereby sensitive feedback provided to the user is hidden. For example, text password systems hide users’ passwords with dots. Feedback may be obscured to varying degrees, such as how Apple iPhones only mask password characters after one second or after another character is typed. Another shoulder-surfing defence is obscured input, where the method of credential input is hidden. Examples of this include covered keypads or various PIN alternatives for touch displays [17].

Some KBA systems resist both observation and social engineering attacks, where users are deceived into revealing their authentication secret. In so-called challenge-response schemes, users prove their knowledge of the secret without revealing the entire secret itself, thereby hiding it from observers. For example, GrIDSure [29] (Figures 4 and 5) users




Figure 4: GrIDSure [29] pattern during registration. Numbers represent the order of selected squares.




Figure 5: GrIDSure [29] login grid.

choose a pattern on a grid during registration. At login, users are shown a grid, each square containing a randomly-chosen digit (0 to 9). Users prove knowledge of their pattern by typing the digits on their pattern’s squares. Since each digit appears least twice, users’ patterns are resistant to an observation attack (although multiple observations may compromise the pattern).

4. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

The User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework can be used either to identify the features supported by existing authentication schemes or to produce novel schemes by examining the framework for features that could improve existing schemes or novel scheme designs. To demonstrate the former usage, we describe the features identified in the authentication schemes listed in Table 2. These schemes are a mixture of well-known schemes (e.g., text passwords, GrIDSure [29], PassPoints [31], Passfaces [20]) and schemes that uniquely emphasise features in unique ways (e.g., SISL [4], PTP [15], CGP [14]).

4.1 Text passwords

Standard text passwords assume a keyboard input modality. The process and result of the password entry attempt is visually output to a monitor. People use lexical memory to process text passwords. Text passwords may be based on either a past event in episodic memory, some factual information in semantic memory, or both. With practice, passwords can be typed quickly and automatically from procedural memory, without consciously recalling semantic or episodic password contents. Most text password systems implement obscured feedback by hiding characters in password fields.

4.2 GrIDSure

As described in Section 3.4, GrIDSure requires a visual output device to show the grid and a keyboard to type digits. GrIDSure passwords are a visually-memorised pattern of squares. GrIDSure does not support lexical memory, since digits’ locations on the grid changes every login. Users’ chosen grid patterns are likely stored in semantic memory, in relation to some meaningful object. The primary benefit of GrIDSure is its challenge-response feature. An adversary observing the grid of digits and the user’s input cannot determine the secret pattern with certainty, because each digit is present in at least two grid squares (since there are 10 digits for 25 squares).

4.3 PassPoints

PassPoints [31] is a cued-recall graphical password scheme, whereby users enter a sequence of click-points (with their mouse) on an image as their password. A visual output device is required to display the image and allow the user to select their click-points with a mouse. PassPoints passwords leverage users’ visual memory. When selecting click-points, users may choose locations that contain memorable semantic details or symbolise episodic memories. The presented image acts as a memory cue. After repeated logins, users will likely implicitly recall their click-points through procedural memory.

4.4 Passfaces

Passfaces [20] is a recognition-based graphical password scheme where users are assigned random faces at registration. Users logging in must sequentially select their assigned faces amongst distractor faces. Passfaces supports visual memory. Users may leverage semantic memory to remember specific aspects of their assigned faces. Passfaces utilises perceptual memory, since humans can rapidly recognise familiar faces. Passfaces also employs cueing, where the visual display of the user’s assigned face implicitly cues the user’s memory. Passfaces relies on a visual output device to display the faces. Finally, Passfaces obscures input by randomising the location of the correct face amongst the distractors on the grid. Thus, when using a number pad or keyboard to choose the correct face, it may not be immediately clear to observers which face the user selected. However, when using a mouse or touch device, users must directly click or touch the correct face, which clearly shows the selected faces to an observer.

4.5 Secure Haptic Keypad (SHK)

The Secure Haptic Keypad (SHK) [2] is a special keypad with three haptic keys, which vibrate at different frequencies. To login, the user must press the haptic keys vibrating at the frequency matching their password’s sequence of frequencies. Before each key press, the keys vibration frequencies are randomised, preventing observers from visually discerning users’ passwords.

SHK users may choose to use semantic and/or episodic memory to link their vibration sequence to similar sensations, such a heartbeat, engine, or hummingbird. Procedural memory may enable users to reflexively enter their password based on the tactile sensations. SHK supports obscured input, since observers cannot easily determine the pressed key’s vibration frequency. SHK also obscures feedback by providing no feedback whatsoever during login. A limit to SHK’s adoption may be the required special haptic device providing tactile feedback at specific frequencies.

4.6 Serial Interception Sequence Learning

The Serial Interception Sequence Learning authentication (SISL, Section 3.2.3) [4] uses keyboard input and visual output. Unique amongst authentication schemes, SISL relies entirely on procedural memory. This can be viewed as both a strength and a weakness of the scheme. Users must perform the SISL task for at least 30 minutes during registration, which may affect user adoption. Furthermore, SISL users must strongly trust the authentication system and their own procedural memory, since the shared secret cannot be deliberately retrieved or recorded. However, this is also a great strength; SISL users’ credentials do not need to be explicitly

Scheme	Text	GrIDSure	PassPoints	Passfaces	SHK	SISL	PTP	CGP
Simplification							✓	
Personalisation							✓	
Monitoring								
Conditioning							✓	
Social interaction								
Lexical memory	✓						✓	
Visual memory		✓	✓	✓				✓
Semantic memory	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Episodic memory	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓
Procedural memory	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Perceptual memory				✓				
Cueing			✓	✓				
Keyboard	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	
Mouse			✓	✓				
Touch				✓				
Eye gaze								✓
Haptic					✓			
Vocal								
Visual output	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Tactile feedback					✓			
Auditory								
Obscured input				✓	✓			✓
Obscured feedback	✓				✓			✓
Challenge-response		✓						

Table 2: User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework.

remembered, cannot be deliberately divulged, and are difficult for attackers to guess. For this reason, SISL is a valuable addition to the authentication field, since it illustrates the potential of procedural memory, which is rarely leveraged. A novel SISL-based scheme may be more practical by supporting additional memory features from this framework for users to leverage when learning their credentials, thereby potentially reducing registration time. This illustrates how our framework can identify particularly valuable features in existing schemes and suggest additional improvements towards more secure or usable authentication schemes.

In addition to analysing existing schemes, the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework can support the innovation of creative and novel authentication schemes. This can be accomplished by either isolating beneficial features in one scheme and implementing them into another scheme, or substituting one feature for another, thereby producing a novel scheme with different properties, while retaining many of the original scheme’s benefits. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate both approaches by describing the framework-inspired design and analysis of Persuasive Text Passwords and Cued Gaze-Points.

4.7 Persuasive Text Passwords (PTP)

The cued-recall graphical password system Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) [7] demonstrates how persuasion can influence users to choose more secure passwords. Despite their advantages, cued-recall graphical passwords could pose accessibility problems for users with eyesight or fine-motor control challenges. The scheme is also susceptible to observation attacks. Forget et al. [15] developed a persuasive approach to influencing users to create more secure text passwords named Persuasive Text Passwords (PTP). At registra-

tion, once PTP users choose a password, PTP suggests improvements to passwords’ security by placing random characters at random positions in users’ passwords (see Figures 6 and 7). Users may shuffle for an alternative improvement they may find more memorable.

PTP supports the following features identified in our framework. Since PTP is largely based on text passwords, the two schemes share many features. Their textual nature clearly relies on users’ lexical memory. Users may remember their password with semantic memory or episodic memory, depending on the chosen initial password. As with text passwords, we believe that with sufficient practice, users’ procedural memory would facilitate password entry without requiring the conscious retrieval of the password’s contents from memory. Both schemes also obscure feedback by masking the echoed password on a visual output device during login, which users input with the keyboard. Text passwords and PTP differ in their use of persuasive features. While text passwords do not leverage any form of persuasion, PTP leverages the following three persuasive features:

Simplification (Section 3.1.1). Since the PTP system takes on the responsibility of ensuring the password is secure, users can focus on making their password memorable, thereby simplifying the password creation task. Furthermore, the users’ path-of-least-resistance is to comply with the system’s initial suggestion, which is more secure than shuffling until a weaker set of characters (such as all lowercase characters) are found. Thus, when creating a new password, PTP makes the most secure (i.e., random) choice the least burdensome.

Personalisation (Section 3.1.2). Since users choose their pre-improvement password, users are likely to feel a kinship towards their password and thus are more likely to comply




Figure 6: PTP [15] password creation before applying the persuasive improvement.

with the system’s suggestions. Furthermore, we expect users are most likely to be open to password suggestions when creating one. Thus, PTP applies its persuasion at the most opportune moment. The persuasion may also develop users’ mental model of secure passwords, potentially leading them to apply the PTP random-character placement method to their other passwords.

Conditioning (Section 3.1.4). Shuffling repeatedly to find a specific set of (less random) system-assigned characters can be tedious. The PTP system makes less secure choices less attractive, hence guiding users away from poor security decisions.

While user study results suggested that PTP helps users create more memorable and secure passwords than standard passwords [15], users may have difficulty remembering multiple PTP passwords. To address this problem, we can systematically examine the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework for features that may support multiple password recall. Cueing (Section 3.2.4) may serve this purpose, and has been shown to increase password memorability in the cued-recall graphical password schemes. A similar effect may be possible by providing users with some kind of cue to remind them of the correct textual response without compromising security. Ideally, this memory-enhancement may also enable users to remember more secure credentials.

4.8 Cued Gaze-Points (CGP)

While graphical passwords propose to leverage the human ability to more easily recognise and recall images over text [24], click-based graphical passwords are particularly susceptible to shoulder-surfing: attackers may observe or record users as they enter passwords. Text passwords may also be vulnerable to similar attacks [26]. To address this issue, a systematic examination using the User-Centred Authentication Feature Framework suggests some possible solutions. Since the mouse cursor reveals users’ click locations, we could directly apply the obscured feedback feature to make the mouse cursor more difficult for observers to identify. For examples, the mouse cursor could be obscured or hidden amongst multiple mouse cursors [10]. However, such a system may be difficult to use. Thus, we can explore other features that may be used in concert with obscured feedback. For instance, the input modality could be changed from the mouse, which requires an on-screen cursor, to eye-gaze, where the user implicitly knows where they are gazing without any feedback obvious to an observer, thereby also applying the obscured feedback feature.




Figure 7: PTP [15] password creation after applying the Insert-2 persuasive improvement.

Forget et al. [14] implemented these features as Cued Gaze-Points (CGP), an eye-gaze version of Cued Click-Points (CCP) [9], where users select points on a sequence of images with their eye-gaze instead of the mouse cursor. CGP leverages visual memory for locations or objects on images. Users may choose their gaze-points based on semantic details or episodic recollections. With some practice, users could implicitly remember their gaze-point locations from procedural memory and the presentation of the cue. Users’ gaze-points are obscured input, since an attacker observing the login process would have difficulty determining their locations. Furthermore, the feedback obfuscated is supported, since observing attackers cannot easily determine users’ gaze locations. Obviously, users’ eye gaze is the intended input modality, and a visual output modality (e.g., a monitor) is required.

Forget et al.’s [14] user study results showed a clear trade-off between usability and security. They found the smaller tolerance (target) size too difficult to use. However, the larger tolerance size is more vulnerable to password guessing attacks, due to fewer possible distinct gaze-point locations. This would be an acceptable trade-off in certain environments, such as ATMs, where CGP is has greater password space and shoulder-surfing resistance than PINs. We found that 93% of login attempts in the larger tolerance condition were eventually successful, indicating that users are capable of using the system with additional practice. Participants were also confident they could improve with practice.

5. CONCLUSION

Innovations in usable authentication have thus far been designed in an unstructured manner. This framework’s principled set of features highlights that there are more opportunities for novel and useful schemes by more systematically classifying and applying beneficial authentication features. For example, the work on graphical passwords [3] largely addresses memorability, but we highlight the rich memory knowledge and other aspects of authentication that remain largely unexplored. This framework aims to make explicit the features that authentication schemes can support, to inspire the conception of novel and useful authentication schemes. By methodically using our framework to identify beneficial features in one scheme and transfer them to alternative schemes of varying designs, an ecosystem of multiple secure and usable authentication schemes can be developed.

Choosing amongst a wide array of proposed authentication schemes can be time-consuming and confusing. This framework can also assist people in selecting a scheme best suited

to their needs and usage context. IT professionals can use our framework to identify features they and their users require, thereby shortlisting schemes that support these features. For example, an organisation with accessibility concerns could focus on authentication schemes with particular input or output modalities. An organisation building touch-screen software may favour schemes designed for touch interfaces. Administrators may wish to avoid using certain spectra of a feature type. For example, applications for blind people should avoid schemes relying heavily on visual output modalities. While this framework is designed to support authentication mechanisms, it may also benefit the design and classification of support mechanisms (e.g., password managers, writing down, single sign-on).

Authentication research and technology advances will invariably lead to novel features and classes, bringing them to the attention of researchers and designers for further study and implementation into novel and useful schemes. Adding novel features to the framework can also assist security professionals and users identify and choose schemes that best suit their needs. Ultimately, we hope this will lead to a diverse ecosystem of authentication schemes where users can choose schemes best suited their abilities and preferences.

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